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LABOUR MARKET ENFORCEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: SHOULD 
WHISTLEBLOWERS HAVE A GREATER ROLE ? 
 
INTRODUCTION   
        Labour market enforcement can be achieved through a variety of 
mechanisms, including proactive, targeted inspections conducted by a well –
funded agency, self-regulation by employers and the encouragement of 
workers to report concerns.1  On the basis that inspectorates in the UK have 
been under-resourced historically and that reliance on self-regulation is 
particularly objectionable in sectors that have a record of providing low pay 
and poor working conditions, this article will explore the potential for using 
whistleblowing by both workers and non-workers as a method of enforcing 
labour standards. However, the author’s view is that, in principle, policing 
should be conducted by inspectors working in conjunction with union or other 
labour representatives rather than relying on individual workers to raise 
concerns.2 This is particularly important in industries where small firms are 
prevalent and individuals may feel particularly vulnerable to retaliation if they 
speak up about the work environment.3 Nevertheless, given the low likelihood 
of government inspections and low levels of unionisation in the private sector, 
it is suggested that enhancing the protection given to whistleblowers who 
report suspected wrongdoing might deter employer non-compliance and prove 
cost effective.4 Although such a move might encounter objections, it is worth 
                                                          
1 See generally Fine and Gordon(2010).   
2  See Quinlan (2014).  
3  See Croucher (2013).  
4  This may be the case even if rewards are offered for information. On whistleblowing as an 
economically efficient way of enforcing the law see Givati (2016). 
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noting that current UK legislation already endorses vigilantism in the public 
interest. 5 
1. WHAT IS WHISTLEBLOWING AND WHY IS IT RELEVANT TO LABOUR 
MARKET ENFORCEMENT? 
Researchers often refer to the following definition of whistleblowing: “The 
disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or 
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or 
organisations that may be able to effect action” (Near and Miceli,1985). This 
covers the use of both internal and external channels of communication as well 
as anonymous reporting but does not coincide with the statutory definitions in 
the UK or elsewhere. For example, voluntary workers might be regarded as 
organisation members but such people are not ‘workers’ for the purposes of 
Part IVA of the UK Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996).6 Indeed, who 
should be treated as workers has been a hotly contested issue in the new gig 
economy and case law has demonstrated that the distinction between 
employees, workers and self –employed has become blurred.7  
Whistleblowing  has been analysed from a range of perspectives, for example, 
the human right to free speech (Wragg 2015); organisational citizenship (Organ 
1988); principled organisational dissent (Miceli, Near and Dworkin, 2008); the 
risk society (Beck 1992) and as a form of employee “voice” (Hirschman 1970). 
However, a ‘power resources’ approach (Skivenes and Trygstad,2015) seems 
particularly relevant when considering the potential role of whistleblowing in 
                                                          
5  In addition to the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and the Employment Rights Act 1996 
Part IVA which apply to workers, there are counter-terrorism and money laundering statutes which 
require persons to report concerns about suspected wrongdoing.  
6  Part IVA was inserted by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. ‘Worker‘ is defined in Section 
230 ERA 1996 
7  See Taylor Review (2017) and Pimlico Plumbers Ltd v Smith [2018] UKSC 29 
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the context of labour market enforcement. Many of those covered by minimum 
labour standards are undertaking precarious work and may not speak up owing 
to ignorance of their rights, duress or fear of reprisals etc. Those protected by 
the statutory provisions on human trafficking/modern slavery may also feel 
vulnerable for other reasons, for example, the fear that their right to remain in 
the country may be questioned. In these circumstances people may feel 
powerless to complain or raise a concern about wrongdoing either within their 
organisation or externally. Thus it is argued here that, unless statutory 
whistleblowing protection is extended, non-workers who suffer violations of 
labour standards will have to rely on proactive investigations by the 
enforcement agencies or others raising concerns are their behalf. Given the 
inadequate resources currently devoted to such investigations, this article 
argues for more consideration being given to the role of whistleblowing.  
One feature of whistleblowers is that they do not necessarily possess evidence 
of wrongdoing but merely a suspicion or belief. Although witness protection 
may available in certain circumstances,8 whistleblowers are not always 
witnesses to wrongdoing.  To some extent both the National Minimum Wage 
Act 1998  (NMWA 1998) and Part IVA of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 
1996) deal with retaliation by offering compensation to workers who suffer 
unlawful detriment or dismissal.9 There are clear signs that labour market 
enforcement bodies are aware of the value of receiving information about 
possible non-compliance from third parties (for example, other agencies). 
Indeed, section 6 of the IA 2016 allows people to disclose information to the 
                                                          
8 According to the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, witness protection is generally 
directed to people who have provided crucial evidence and against whom there is a substantial 
threat. This definition does not preclude police forces and law enforcement agencies from offering 
protection measures to witnesses and others at risk. 
9 It should be noted that neither of these statutes protect whistleblowers from discrimination at the 
point of hiring.  
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Director of Labour Market Enforcement (DLME) to enable him or her to 
exercise their functions and the DLME can share this information with the 
persons specified in Schedule 1 to the IA 2016. 10  However, there appears to 
have been little discussion about measures that might be taken to protect non-
workers who are willing to raise concerns about suspected violations of labour 
standards.  
2. THEORIES OF ENFORCEMENT 
Deterrence and compliance are the two main approaches to enforcement. 
While deterrence focuses on deliberate violations, compliance theory is based 
on the notion that breaches of the law may be unintentional and may arise 
from an employer’s lack of knowledge and/or competence (Weil 2008). It is the 
author’s view that whistleblowing can contribute to both approaches. In terms 
of compliance, whistleblowers may be able to provide evidence that labour 
standards are not being adhered to as a result of an employer’s lack of 
awareness. Formal complaint channels are important in this respect but it 
should also be noted that some people want to raise concerns about their own 
treatment or that of others rather than lodge a personal grievance or general 
complaint.  
By way of contrast, deterrence theory assumes that many infringements of 
labour rights result from the intentional acts of employers. This can be 
regarded not simply as a personal problem for those suffering violations but as 
a matter of public interest since a labour market ‘free –for –all’ can result in  
employers experiencing unfair competition as well as the flouting of the 
human rights of workers. Thus it is argued that the low level of inspections in 
                                                          
10  IA 2016,s7 deals with restrictions on data sharing.  
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the UK 11 means that employers may be willing to take the risk of non-
compliance i.e. the expected costs of investigation are insufficient to cause 
organisations to comply voluntarily.12 The willingness of workers and non-
workers to disclose information about alleged wrongdoing may be important if 
it increases the chance of employer exposure to reactive interventions by 
relevant agencies and/or reputational damage. As the DLME notes “the 
perception of the risk of inspections is as important to deterrence as their 
actual frequency”. 13 However, for a variety of reasons, many people will feel 
unable to raise concerns and will therefore rely on proactive enforcement, 
which itself can have a strong deterrent effect.14  
The DLME asserts that the most effective approach to labour market 
enforcement will be the adoption of both the compliance and deterrence 
theories. Thus the interesting question becomes how should the balance 
between the two be struck? To some extent the answer will depend on 
whether the primary goal is to safeguard labour rights or to protect employers 
from over -burdensome intrusions into the way they run their organisations. It 
goes without saying those affected by the negative impact of non –compliance 
will not care whether this results from intentional or unintentional employer 
behaviour, unless greater compensation is awarded where intentional 
wrongdoing is established. We now turn to the role of the specific authorities 
and will return to the theoretical approaches in the conclusion. 
 
                                                          
11 According the DLME Strategy Document 2018/9, the average employer can expect an inspection 
around once every five hundred years.  
12  The economic costs here being calculated by multiplying the probability of inspection by the 
penalties that might be imposed if infringements are found. See Becker (1968). 
13  Strategy Document 2018/9 
14  Such effect cannot be adequately measured since it is not directly observable. 
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3. THE ROLE OF THE ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES AND TRADE UNIONS IN 
THE UK 
 
According to the Home Office, sections 1-33 of the Immigration Act 2016 (IA 
2016) were introduced ‘to improve the effectiveness of the enforcement of 
certain employment rights to prevent non-compliance and the exploitation of 
vulnerable workers, via an intelligence –led, target approach’. (Home 
Office;2016) 15 Prior to the IA 2016 workplace rights could be exercised by 
individuals at Employment Tribunals (ETs) and a range of bodies was 
responsible for enforcing legislative obligations.16  Section 1 of the  IA 2016 
created the role of DLME with a view to co-ordinating the work of the three 
‘enforcement authorities’: namely, the HMRC National Minimum 
Wage/National Living Wage (NMW/NLW), the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse 
Authority (GLAA) and the Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate (EASI). 17 
 
Chapter 1 of the IA 2016 gave stronger powers to the new GLAA (the only 
enforcing authority whose remit covers all “trigger offences”) 18  and also 
introduced labour market enforcement undertakings  (LMEU’s) and orders 
(LMEO’s) .  LMEU’s can be sought where an enforcing authority believes that a 
person is committing a ‘trigger offence’, that existing civil sanctions will not 
prevent or stop non-compliance and prosecution is not deemed appropriate.  
Thus they are ‘not designed to replace the use of current sanctions to punish 
breaches and seek redress and should be used alongside these’ (Home Office 
                                                          
15 IA 2016, s 3 defines the terms ‘non-compliance in the labour market,’ ‘labour market enforcement  
functions’ and ‘labour market offence’. 
16 This included the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), 
the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, local authorities etc. 
17  IA 2016,s 14(5). 
18  These are listed in IA 2016, s 14(4). 
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and DBEIS; 2016) .19  Significantly, a notice seeking an LMEU cannot be 
imposed on a business:  ‘the business determines whether or not to give the 
undertaking’. Thus service of the notice triggers a negotiation period during 
which the recipient has the chance to ‘propose alternative means of achieving 
compliance’ (Home Office and DBEIS; 2016). 20 It is envisaged that an enforcing 
authority will apply for an LMEO where an undertaking has not been given 
within the negotiation period or it thinks that an undertaking has been 
breached. LMEO’s can be made by a court and a two- year custodial sentence 
and/or an unlimited fine is available where such an order is breached. 21 It 
almost goes without saying that such breaches might be detected by an 
enforcement authority, by a worker currently protected by legislation against 
retaliation or a person not so protected.  
 
Historically, the enforcement authorities responded to complaints but, 
according to the DLME, they are ‘now adopting a broader- based enforcement 
model which looks to expand and optimise the use of intelligence from wider 
sources to expose cases of hitherto hidden exploitation’ (Director of Labour 
Market Enforcement; 2017a). Section 41 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (MSA 
2015) requires  the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner (IASC) ‘to 
encourage good practice in the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of modern slavery offences and the identification of victims’ and 
suggests some things that that IASC might do. These include the provision of 
education and training; consulting with and making recommendations to any 
public authority; 22 and undertaking or supporting research.  Given that his 
                                                          
19 Paragraph 16. IA 2016, s 25  provides that the enforcing authorities must have regard to the Code 
of Practice. 
20 Paragraph 23.  
21 IA 2016, s18.   
22 MSA 2015,s43 requires public authorities to comply with an IASC request to co-operate.  
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Annual Report for 2016-17 gives top priority to ‘improving victim identification 
and care’ (Independent Anti –Slavery Commissioner; 2017), it seems 
appropriate to consider the following two questions: (1) what role can trade 
unions play in dealing with the exploitation of workers? (2) do victims or others 
who are aware of slavery or trafficking need more protection if they are to be 
encouraged to report? 
According to the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), modern slavery lies at the 
extreme end of a continuum in which respect for workers’ rights and their 
ability to claim those rights lie at the opposite end. Hence it can be argued that 
slavery will not be removed until action is taken to deal with exploitation and 
vulnerability more generally. The ETI believes that ‘the single biggest factor that 
can contribute to ending extreme labour exploitation is to recognise workers’ 
rights to organize: to collectively negotiate terms and conditions of work and 
to have the freedom to leave abusive employers. The risk of modern slavery 
dramatically decreases in workplaces where trade unions are encouraged to 
operate’ (Ethical Trading Initiative; 2018). 23 In the UK, trade unions are an 
important channel of communication within the workplace and are likely to 
have some experience of dealing with industry regulators. Unfortunately, 
modern slavery is often concentrated in sectors that are difficult to organise 
and might not be of strategic importance to over-stretched unions. 24 Another 
barrier to union engagement at grassroots level that is particularly relevant to 
our discussion is the absence of enforcement powers which might allow unions 
themselves to take action.25 
                                                          
23  Trade unions are likely to have experience of dealing with regulators and enforcement agencies. 
24 See Ford (2015). 
25  See Anderson and Rogaly (2005).   
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Section 2 of the IA 2016 requires the DLME to publish a strategy that includes 
how the enforcement functions should be exercised (including education, 
training and research)26 and the activities the DLME proposes to undertake in 
relation to the establishment of an information hub. 27 In his July 2017 strategy 
document 28 the DLME refers to changes in the previous thirty years which 
have created challenges in the enforcement of legislation. In addition to the 
steady reduction in union membership, he points to the increase in contracting 
out and outsourcing as well as the nature of work in the gig economy. 
However, even if the uncertainties about employment status are somehow 
resolved, for example, by deeming all dependent staff to be workers, the 
question of how to encourage and protect members of the public who have no 
workplace connection but wish to raise concerns will remain. 
One of the four principles of enforcement highlighted by the DLME is 
‘deterrence effect’ 29 and he points to reliance on ‘the perceived probability of 
investigation and the expected level of penalty’ (DLME, 2017b).  Similarly, the 
Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner’s (IASC) second priority is ‘boosting 
the law enforcement and criminal justice response’ (IASC, 2017).  In this 
respect it might be argued that the ability and willingness of whistleblowers 
(whether they are workers or not) to raise concerns about wrongdoing might 
also promote employer compliance with the law which is regarded as vital to 
ensuring a level playing field in a market economy.30 Indeed, the DLME  
identifies the question of whether reporting non-compliance should be made 
                                                          
26  IA 2016,s 4 requires the submission of an annual report to the Secretary of State which includes 
an assessment of the extent of education, training and research carried out.  
27  IA 2016,s 8 provides details about the purpose of the information hub. 
28  Issued under IA 2016,s2. 
29  The others are: prioritisation; sustainability and system -wide impacts. 
30  Non -compliance is unfair to compliant employers and can push some compliant businesses into 
non-compliance. See, for example, Confederation of British Industry (2017).  
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easier as an issue that is common to all enforcement bodies. Before discussing 
whistleblowing to selected regulators who are not directly concerned with the 
labour market (see  below), we will discuss its potential role in relation to the 
bodies concerned with the NMW/NLW, modern slavery, health and safety, 
gangmasters, and employment agencies.   
 
4. THE APPROACH OF LABOUR MARKET BODIES TO PARTICULAR ISSUES. 
 
5.1  The NMW/NLW 
Compliance with the NMW/NLW is important both for ensuring the incomes 
and rights of workers and dealing with undercutting by rogue employers in a 
competitive market. The fact that intentional non -compliance 31 may be 
associated with forced labour emphasises the need for the DLME to liaise 
closely with the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. According the Low 
Pay Commission (LPC): ‘Our best estimate suggests that, at its peak in the year, 
underpayment affects between 300,000 and 580,000 people’ (Low Pay 
Commission, 2017).  However, there is no an accurate estimate of non-
compliance with the minimum wage provisions so it is difficult to assess the 
effectiveness of HMRC enforcement activities over time. 
 
One mechanism for private law enforcement is the right given to workers by 
the NMWA 1998 to sue for underpayment 32 and to seek compensation for 
detriments suffered as a result of exercising the right to the minimum wage .33 
Unfortunately, legal aid is not available for ET cases  and, partly as a result of 
                                                          
31  On non-compliance as a business model see Clark and Herman (2017). 
32 To avoid retaliation workers may be tempted to claim only when they have left an underpaying 
job. 
33  See NMWA 1998,ss 17 and 23.   
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the fee regime in existence until 2017,34 the number of claims has fallen in 
recent years.  While trade unions have no formal role in enforcement, they 
sometimes fund ET claims brought by members. However, a lack of resources 
means that they have to be selective in supporting legal proceedings. Indeed, 
however attractive the ET system may seem in principle, it seems highly 
unlikely that it will ever return to the original vision of being informal, easily 
accessible, speedy and inexpensive. More important, perhaps, is the 
willingness of union officials to raise concerns with employers and the 
enforcement authorities about underpayment in relation to both members 
and non-members. In these circumstances union officials are likely to be 
protected from victimisation on the basis that they were engaging in union 
activities within section 146(1)(b) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA 1992). 35  
 
HMRC enforces the NMWA 1998 on behalf of the Department of Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy via a service agreement and its current policy 
has three main strands: investigating complaints from workers to the Advisory, 
Conciliation, and Arbitration Service (ACAS) helpline; 36 pro-active 
investigations and campaigns designed to raise the awareness of employers 
and workers. The number of workers for whom HMRC obtained NMW arrears 
                                                          
34  The Supreme Court declared the existing regime unlawful in R v Lord Chancellor [2017] IRLR 911  
but a replacement scheme may well be introduced. 
35 Industrial action to enforce the NMW/NLW could be lawful if all the ballot and notice 
requirements of the TULRCA 1992, Part V are satisfied.  
36  The HMRC has its own Fraud Hotline. The information report form advises: ‘For your own safety 
you shouldn’t: try to find out more about the fraud; let anyone know you are making a report….’ 
https://www.tax.service.gov.uk/shortforms/form/TEH_IRF 
In addition to Crimestoppers (discussed below), there are also ‘hotlines’ for benefit fraud, 
immigration enforcement, customs and anti-terrorism. Feedback is offered in relation to 
immigration or customs crime in some cases and not all report forms allow those supplying 
information to remain anonymous.  
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was 98,000 in 2016/17. 37 Even with the removal of ET fees it would seem that 
the most vulnerable workers 38 are going to find it difficult to use ET’s and will 
need their rights enforced by HMRC officers who are empowered to present 
complaints on behalf of workers in certain circumstances.39 Indeed, the Low 
Pay Commission (LPC) suggests that the HMRC’s ‘more pro-active approach to 
investigations may be helping to compensate for the reluctance or inability to 
complain that some groups of workers may have’ (Low Pay Commission, 
2017).40 Such inability may result from a lack of awareness of wage 
entitlements 41 and a person’s reluctance to enforce the NMW/NLW may stem 
from the fear that this may cause the business to fold or their status as illegal 
workers  or benefit claimants will be exposed.  
 
The LPC’s recommendations in the September 2017 document (Low Pay 
Commission, 2017) underline the role of information both in raising awareness 
of NMW/NLW rates and in reducing underpayment . Although the goal of 
increasing the number of formal complaints made by workers to the ACAS 
                                                          
37 According to the Low Pay Commission (2017), this amounted to just over £10million in both 
2015/16 and 2016/17. Four employers were prosecuted in 2016/17 for non-compliance with the 
legislation. 
38 According the Low Pay Commission (2017), underpaid workers tend to be women, part-time and 
hourly paid but salaried and public sector worker appear over-represented. Although there is little 
difference across different sized firms, those working for the smallest businesses have an above 
average chance of being underpaid.  
39  NMW 1998, s19D(1)  provides: “If a requirement to pay a sum to a worker contained in a notice of 
underpayment is not complied with in whole or in part, an officer acting for the purposes of this Act 
may, on behalf of any worker to whom the requirement relates— (a) present a complaint under 
section 23(1)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (deductions from worker's wages in 
contravention of section 13 of that Act) to an employment tribunal in respect of any sums due to the 
worker by virtue of section 17.” 
40 See also Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, (2014).  
41 In their Spring Report 2016 , the LPC recommended that all medium and large employers be 
required to include the pay rate and total number of hours worked for NMW/NLW purposes on pay 
slips (LPC, 2016). It almost goes without saying that it would be helpful if payslips also identified the 
current NMW/NLW rates.  
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helpline is identified,42 no mention is made of concerns being raised by others 
who suspect non-compliance, for example, competing employers, family, 
friends, welfare rights advisers.43 In addition to calling for efforts to increase 
the number of prosecutions 44 and publicising those that take place, the LPC 
sees value in the naming of recalcitrant employers.45 Not only might ‘naming 
and shaming’ serve as a reputational deterrent but drawing the public’s 
attention to non-compliance may encourage individuals to come forward with 
information about their own treatment or that of others. Again, if the HMRC’s 
policy of targeting certain sectors is to work, it needs to receive as much 
information as possible about problem areas. The LPC points to the 
opportunities for HMRC to gather intelligence from other Government bodies 
and discusses the apparent difficulty in handling third party complaints. Quite 
rightly, it suggests that the issue of confidentiality can be dealt with by formally 
nominating someone to act as a personal representative.46 However, it omits 
to mention the potential supply of information from those who are neither 
complainants themselves nor acting on behalf of a complainant but 
nevertheless have a concern that an employer is non-compliant. 
                                                          
42 There were 4600 enquiries in 2016/17 which the LPC regards as a low figure in the light of 
estimates of the scale of the problem (Low Pay Commission, 2017).  
43 An online pay and workers’ rights complaints form was introduced in January 2016 for reporting 
information relating to working hours, employment agencies, gangmasters as well as the national 
minimum wage. The relevant web page makes it clear that complaints can be made on behalf of 
someone else and that the HMRC will send the form to the appropriate regulator. 
https://www.gov.uk/pay-and-work-rights (last accessed 15th January 2018). 
44 There have been only 13 successful prosecutions since 2007. The LPC believes that “prosecutions 
are a very powerful deterrent and that they are currently underused” (Low Pay Commission, 2017). 
45 Employers must have broken the NMW/NLW legislation and owe over £100 in wages.  By the end 
of 2017, over 1000 employers have been exposed in this way. 
46 The LPC recommends that ‘Government communication efforts include better publicity around 
the third party complaints process’. See Low Pay Commission (2017).  
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Looking to the future, the LPC estimates that that the anticipated changes in 
NLW to £9 per hour by 2020 will increase coverage from about 5 per cent of 
the workforce in 2015 to about 14 per cent in 2020 (an estimated 3.3 million 
people). As the number of workers entitled to minimum rates rises it seems 
likely that the number being underpaid will also increase. The HMRC’s budget 
has risen to £25million for the three years from 2017/18. However, the recent 
expansion of resources has not resulted in a significant rise in the number of 
investigations but to larger and more complex cases being taken on. In 
addition, the introduction of ‘self-correction’, which requires employers who 
have been caught underpaying to check if any other workers or former 
workers have also been underpaid, has allowed arrears to be identified 
without further expenditure by the HMRC. As well as prosecutions and the 
new labour market enforcement undertakings and orders regime, civil 
penalties can be imposed. If the arrears for a particular worker are less than 
£100 then a minimum of £100 applies. Otherwise, in addition to any back pay, 
the employer faces a  penalty equivalent to 200 per cent of the arrears up to a 
maximum of £20,000 per worker.  However, the penalty is halved if both the 
unpaid wages and penalty are paid within fourteen days. 47 To some extent this 
discounting might be regarded as inconsistent with the approach taken in 
paragraph 5 of the Code of Practice on Labour Market Enforcement 
Undertakings and Orders 2016 . This states that the new labour market 
enforcement regime ‘is designed to ensure that employers are no longer able 
to treat fines as acceptable business overheads’.  
 As with other enforcement bodies, there will always be a question about  the 
proportion of funds available that should be earmarked for responding to 
                                                          
47  The average penalty in 2016/17 was £4,700.   
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individual complaints about non -compliance.48 If HMRC chose to be more pro-
active and give priority to risk-based enforcement, 49 how would it secure the 
information needed to assess risks other than by inspections? One answer 
would be for the enforcement bodies and other organisations to share 
information and, with this in mind, the DLME is keen to fully establish an 
intelligence hub using the latest technology by 2018.50 Such a hub could draw 
on national statistics, academic research studies and reports from trade 
unions, employer organisations and civil society groups. However, there will 
always be an additional need to receive direct allegations or suspicions of non-
compliance. Indeed, the encouragement of third parties to blow the whistle 
may be a useful tool in dealing with employers who appear unconcerned about 
the consequences of breaking the law because they believe that there is only a 
miniscule chance of being inspected and that their staff will not lodge a 
complaint or raise a concern.  
 
4.2    Modern slavery and human trafficking  
It is an offence to hold another person in slavery or servitude or to arrange or 
facilitate the travel of another person with a view to that person being 
exploited. 51 Importantly, in order to persuade people to come forward with 
information, section 45 of the MSA 2015 provides a defence for slavery and 
trafficking victims who commit an offence.  Section 52 of the MSA 2015 obliges 
specified public authorities to notify the Secretary of State about any person in 
                                                          
48 There were 399 enforcement officers in September 2017. 
49 According to the Confederation of British Industry: ‘Using risk models to proactively target the 
enforcement agencies’ powers on employers most at risk of non-compliance is supported by the 
business community as it minimises burdens on the compliant majority’ (CBI. 2017).  For a critique of 
a risk-based approach instead of regular inspections see James and Walters (2016).  
50  IA 2016, ss 6-8  refer to information gateways and an information hub. 
51  MSA 2015, ss 1& 2. MSA 2015 s3 provides a broad definition of ‘exploitation’. 
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England and Wales who is suspected to be a victim of human trafficking or 
slavery. The information to be provided is set out in the Modern Slavery Act 
(Duty to Notify) Regulations 2015 52 and the Notification of a Potential Victim 
of Modern Slavery form (MS1) allows the person making the referral to keep 
the potential adult victim anonymous.53 Organisations that are not obliged to 
notify are encouraged to do so voluntarily and the author assumes that 
information would be welcomed from other sources, including individual 
whistleblowers.  
Section 42 of the MSA 2015 provides for strategic plans which specify the 
IASC’s priorities and intended activities. In his Strategic Plan 2015 -17, the IASC  
mentions the establishment of a ‘fit for purpose modern slavery helpline’. 
Since this is intended to encourage ‘proactive reporting’ as well as supporting 
and assisting potential victims, this mechanism might also be described as a 
‘hotline’ for raising concerns. However, empirical research indicates that 
people will only use ‘hotlines’ if they feel it is safe to do so and that the 
information they supply will be taken seriously. 54 Thus careful attention 
should be given to a range of issues including: accessability, confidentiality, 
anonymity, the training of recipients of concerns and the provision of 
feedback. 
Section 49(1)(c) of the MSA 201 requires the Secretary of State to issue 
guidance about ‘arrangements for determining whether there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that a person may be a victim of slavery or human 
trafficking’. Arguably, this might extend to the promotion of policies and 
                                                          
52  2015. S.I. 1743. 
53  An adult must not be identifiable if he or she has not consented to the referral. Children do not 
need to consent to enter the National Referral Mechanism (discussed below). 
54  See generally Brown et al (2014). 
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procedures which encourage both workers and the general public to report 
suspicions about slavery or trafficking.  Indeed, a change in culture is needed 
whereby slavery and trafficking are regarded as socially unacceptable as 
domestic violence. Encouragingly, previous public awareness campaigns 
suggest that if the scale and importance of slavery and human trafficking are 
highlighted, rates of reporting may increase and incidences of exploitation may 
decrease. 
Part 6 of the MSA 2015 deals with transparency in supply chains and section 54 
of the MSA 2015 imposes a duty on commercial organisations over a certain 
size to make available a slavery and human trafficking statement for each 
financial year. This statement,which must be approved and signed off at a 
senior level, will reveal the steps the organisation has taken to ensure that 
slavery and human trafficking is not taking place or that the organisation has 
taken no such measures. The Secretary of State may issue guidance and 
section 54(5) of the MSA 2015 outlines six areas that such a statement might 
include. For example, the due diligence processes, the steps taken to assess 
and manage the risk of slavery and human trafficking taking place and the 
relevant training available to staff. It is suggested that such guidance might 
well encourage organisations to ensure that they maintain and publicise a 
speak- up/whistleblowing etc policy and procedure which encourages the 
reporting of suspicions about slavery and trafficking and that annual 
statements identify the number and type of concerns that have been raised 
and how they were dealt with. However, in January 2018 the IASC recorded 
that ‘2016’s corporate modern slavery statements were patchy in quality, with 
some companies failing to produce them at all and others demonstrating little 
meaningful engagement with the issue.’ (IASC, 2018). Unsurprisingly, it has 
been suggested that such statements should become part of an organisation’s 
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annual accounts and thereby subject to audit. In addition, naming and shaming 
could put pressure on businesses to comply.  
The National Referral Mechanism (NRM) provides a framework for identifying 
victims of labour exploitation and ensuring that they receive support in 
accordance with the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Human 
Trafficking.  It is also the means by which the National Crime Agency’s Modern 
Slavery Human Trafficking Unit (MSHTU) collects data. The Home Office 
estimated that in 2014 there were between 10,000 - 13,000 potential victims 
of modern slavery in the UK yet only 2,400 were referred to the National 
Referral Mechanism. The most common matters currently reported by 
potential victims is sexual exploitation followed by labour exploitation, forced 
criminal exploitation and domestic servitude. Unfortunately ‘very few modern 
slavery crimes come to the attention of police and criminal justice agencies, 
and very few offenders are caught and prosecuted’ (IASC,2017). 55 Indeed, in 
his Annual Report 2016-17 the IASC states that ‘the existing NRM has many 
flaws that have been allowed to operate for too long’ and calls for complete 
reform of the system. A particular concern has been that police forces have 
waited for the outcome of an NRM decision before recording a crime.  
5.3   Health and safety  
The HSE’s role  is to protect the health, safety and welfare of workers and to 
safeguard others who may be affected by work activities. The HSE can deal 
with those who fail to comply with legal obligations by issuing warnings or 
                                                          
55  In 2014-15 there were 130 convictions for human trafficking offences.  
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cautions, withdrawing approvals, varying licence conditions, serving 
improvement or prohibition notices and bringing prosecutions.56  Its  
enforcement principles require inspectors to be ‘proportionate in their 
decision –making and mindful in keeping the burden on business to a 
minimum’ (Health and Safety Executive,2015). Unsurprisingly, one of the 
principles applied by the HSE is the targeting of enforcement action and, in 
order to establish priorities and use a risk-based approach, information has to 
be obtained by proactive inspections or other means. Annually HSE conducts 
about 20,000 workplace inspections, investigates over 6,000 incidents and 
considers over 10,000 health and safety concerns reported by workers or other 
people. Since the HSE can discover labour market abuse in the course of its 
work, it would seem vital to have effective  communications with the other 
enforcement authorities mentioned above.  
 
One effect of stating that ‘Low risk activities will not, in general, be subject to 
enforcement unless actual harm has occurred’ is that the HSE will not 
necessarily consider all issues of non-compliance. Indeed, some legal duties do 
not directly impact on the control of risk but still require compliance by the 
duty holder, for example, reporting incidents.57 It is the role of union officials 
and safety representatives to ensure that employer duties are fulfilled and it 
goes without saying that different views might be taken about the levels of risk 
workers are exposed to. Confusion might arise because all workers can receive 
protection under Part IVA of the ERA 1996 if they disclose breaches of a legal 
                                                          
56 Although widespread prosecutions might have a strong deterrent effect this would be very costly 
in terms of time and money. In practice, prosecutions are only brought where there is a combination 
of high risk and extreme failure to meet a clearly defined  and obvious standard.  
57  These are referred to by the HSE as ‘non –risk based compliance and administrative 
arrangements’. Clearly, the absence of compliance and administrative arrangements can undermine 
the operation of an effective health and safety system or indicate bad safety management.  
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obligation.58 Indeed, if enforcement is unlikely to occur because low risk is 
perceived, what is the incentive to raise concerns with the regulator? In so far 
as the concern is dealt with by others (for example, management and unions) 
this may not be a problem but some will argue that, if it is to do its job 
properly, the HSE needs to be aware of persistent non –compliance. In this 
respect it is worth noting that the HSE website encourages anyone who wishes 
to report a health and safety ‘problem’ to use its online form for reporting 
‘concerns’. The other enforcement principles of consistency of approach, 
accountability and transparency are all tied to finite resources and ‘the 
importance of fair treatment to all in promoting and sustaining economic 
growth’ (Health and Safety Executive, 2015). However, it might be commented 
that the health, safety and welfare of workers and the general public is the 
prime purpose of the HSE rather than the protection of business enterprises.   
 
It should also be noted that local authorities have responsibility for enforcing 
health and safety law in certain workplaces and their inspectors are obliged to 
adhere to the HSE’s enforcement policy (see above). The sectors covered 
include: offices, shops, retail and wholesale distribution, hotel and catering 
establishments, residential care homes and the leisure industry. They also 
enforce a range of regulatory legislation which may indirectly bring inspectors 
in Environmental Health and Trading Standards divisions into contact with 
businesses employing migrant labour, for example, licensing, trading standards 
and animal health/ welfare.  
 
                                                          
58  Defined by ERA 1996, section 43K. Additionally, in specified health and safety situations, 
employee representatives have the right not to suffer detriment or dismissal under ERA 1996, ss 44 
and 100.   
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5.4   Gangmasters  
According to the Introductory Report of the DLME (DLME 2017c), up to 2016 
the Gangmasters Licensing Authority  licensed labour providers in farming, 
food processing as well as shellfish gathering.59 As a result of section 11 and 
Schedule 2 to the IA 2016, the GLAA has a much broader role dealing with 
exploitation across the entire labour market and Labour Abuse Prevention 
Officers (LAPOs) have the power to: investigate modern slavery where it 
relates to labour abuse and other labour market offences; arrest suspects;  
enter premises where they have a reasonable belief that labour market 
offences are being committed;  and search and seize evidence of breaches of 
labour market regulations.60 The main focus of the GLAA’s licensing work is to 
respond to information received from both open and covert sources and its 
website asks people to provide information about labour providers who are 
exploiting the welfare and rights of workers .61 It intends to focus on the more 
serious cases where multiple offences have been committed 62 leaving routine 
cases to be dealt with by other enforcement bodies. 
 
 
5.5   Employment agencies 
                                                          
59 In 2015-16, fourteen gangmasters (supplying 2,600 workers ) had their licence revoked for 
breaching standards, for example, paying incorrect tax to HMRC or not paying the NMW/NLW.   
60 Its budget for 2016-17 was £4.8million and it had 70 staff.   
61 A report form is available in eight languages. Although there are circumstances in which 
confidentiality cannot be maintained, the form boldly states that: ‘All information given is held 
confidentially and may be passed to other relevant government law enforcement agencies where it 
will also be held confidentially’. http://www.gla.gov.uk/report-issues/english-report-form/ (last 
accessed 15th January 2018). 
62  In 2015/16 the GLAA conducted 100 compliance inspections and 14 gangmasters had their 
licences revoked. Almost 3000 potential victims of labour exploitation were identified. 
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EASI is a body in the Department of Business Energy and Industrial Strategy 
and  enforces regulations covering 18,000 employment agencies totalling over 
one million workers.63  Thus EASI investigates offences including the placement 
of false job advertisements, employment businesses failing to pay wages and 
providing additional services to work-seekers for a fee before providing any 
work-finding services.  EASI inspectors initially contact an agency where a 
breach has been reported and conduct targeted inspections of high risk 
activities. Although the latest Enforcement Policy Statement (EASI 2018) 
provides that EASI ‘acts pro-actively in carrying out targeted inspections’, the 
Annual Report 2016/17 states that there were fewer ‘visits’ in 2016/7 but 
‘higher outcomes achieved’ (EASI 2017). The Enforcement Policy Statement 
also indicates that, in addition to information from other related enforcement 
bodies, EASI’s risk -based assessment process includes a weighting towards 
geographic areas ‘where there is a higher than average number of complaints 
64, or a pattern is emerging’. Interestingly, the word ‘complainant’ is used 
throughout the document and confidentiality is offered even though the 
statement recognises EASI’s duty to disclose information under the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. As well as sharing intelligence, EASI 
engages in joint working operations with the GLAA, HMRC NMW/NLW, 
Immigration Enforcement, and the Health and Safety Executive (EASI,2017). 
 
5. THE APPROACH OF AGENCIES NOT PRIMARILY FOCUSSING ON THE 
LABOUR MARKET.  
 
6.1   The Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
                                                          
63  In 2016-17 it had a budget of £0.5m and 11 staff.  
64  828 complaints were received in 2016/7. 
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The CQC has enforcement powers under the Health and Social Care Act 2008 
(as amended) to improve health and adult social care services and protect the 
health, safety and welfare of people who use them. Like the HSE, one of the 
principles that guides the use of its powers is proportionality: ‘where 
appropriate, if the provider is able to improve the service on their own and the 
risks to people who use services are not immediate, we will generally work 
with them to improve standards rather than taking enforcement action’ 
(CQC,2015). As with the NHS, it seems clear that workers will not be the only 
people to have concerns about non-compliance and there is potentially a wide 
range of other people with an interest, including patients, their families, 
visitors etc. Indeed, there is a website page entitled ‘Report a concern if you 
are a member of the public’ which deals with the issue of privacy.  By way of 
contrast, the pamphlet entitled ‘Raising a concern with the CQC’ is aimed at 
health and care staff and the guidance for registered providers (CQC, 2013) 65 
helpfully distinguishes between whistleblowing, complaints and grievances. 
Here whistleblowing is defined exclusively in terms of workers and others are 
required to use ‘the service’s complaints procedure’.  Unfortunately, the 
guidance does not indicate what a person should do if they are not satisfied 
with the way in which their complaint has been handled by the service 
provider but refers readers to the CQC website. This states that ‘the next step 
depends on the type of service and how your care is funded’ and suggests 
contact with either the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman or Local 
Government Ombudsman. 
 
6.2    The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
                                                          
65 This covers such issues as how to raise a concern, where to get independent advice, anonymity 
and confidentiality and what the CQC will do with the information it receives.  
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The FCA requires firms’ whistleblowing arrangements to handle disclosures 
from any person 66 and to appoint a whistleblowers’ champion. It accepts that 
not all types of concern raised, for example grievances and customer 
complaints, need to be channelled through whistleblowing procedures. 67 
However, it points out that when other routes have been exhausted or proved 
ineffective the whistleblowing arrangements can serve as a last resort. In 
contrast to the CQC, the FCA takes a wider approach to whistleblowing than 
Part IVA ERA 1996 and provides ‘the same level of anonymity to all who 
disclose to us’ (Financial Conduct Authority, 2015). Indeed, it seems that about 
half of the disclosures received come from employees of regulated firms who 
are not entitled to protection under Part IVA of the ERA 1996.  
The FCA  acknowledges the valuable intelligence provided by whistleblowers, 
especially in relation to financial crime.68 More specifically, its website 
indicates that whistleblowing has helped the FCA in relation to: issuing fines 
and warning letters to firms and individuals; varying  and withdrawing 
permissions and ‘other kinds of early involvement like asking firms to change 
their business activities’.69 There is a dedicated whistleblowing team which 
provides as much feedback as it can in the particular circumstances and 
records whether a whistleblower alleges that they have suffered a detriment 
as a result of making an internal disclosure to their firm.  
6.3   The Environment Agency (EA) 
                                                          
66   Similarly, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission welcomes reports of misconduct 
from members of the public. However, unlike the Fair Work Ombudsman, the Corporations Act 2001 
does not protect anonymous whistleblowers. 
67  The US Securities and Exchange Commission provides an online complaint form for filing “a tip, 
complaint or referral.” 
68   In 2014, 1367 people blew the whistle from which 1100 intelligence reports were produced. 
(Financial Conduct Authority,2015). 
69  https://www.fca.org.uk/print/firms/whistleblowing (last accessed 15th January 2018). 
25 
 
In its detailed enforcement and sanctions statement, the EA points out that it 
works closely with a wide range of bodies, including civil society groups and 
the communities it serves. Its main approach to securing compliance is the 
provision of clear advice and guidance but using enforcement powers is stated 
to be an important part of securing a better environment. As with other 
regulators, mention is made of engaging with business and giving ‘proper 
consideration to the value of economic progress’.70 The accompanying 
guidance describes the potential enforcement responses and, in discussing the 
public interest factor, the EA  indicates that ‘where the use of a sanction is 
likely to reduce future self-reporting of offences or non-compliance, a different 
sanction may be appropriate’.  By way of encouragement to raise concerns, the 
EA operates both an incident and a flood telephone line. Although the relevant 
web page states that waste crime can be reported anonymously to 
Crimestoppers and some incidents should be notified to the local council or 
utility company, no mention is made of raising concerns in writing and an email 
address is not displayed here.  
 
 6.4   The Food Standards Agency (FSA) 
According to its Annual Report and Consolidated Accounts 2016-17, the FSA’s  
model for regulation is risk -based and proportionate, it aims to enhance public 
trust and puts consumers first (Food Standards Agency,2017). The FSA website 
offers an online form which can be used to report a food problem in the UK to 
a local authority. More specifically, the National Food Crime Unit’s  (NFCU) role 
is intelligence collection and analysis and in 2016 a facility was launched to 
enable information about food fraud or food crime to be reported 
                                                          
70  The EA refers to the usual regulatory principles of proportionality, consistency, transparency, 
targeting and accountability.  
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confidentially or anonymously.  Food crime is defined as: ‘Financially motivated 
dishonesty relating to food production or supply,which is either complex or 
results in serious detriment to consumers, businesses or the overall public’. 71 
Although potential whistleblowers may have difficulty in identifying motives 
and distinguishing serious from non-serious detriment, the NFCU website 
makes it  clear that anyone with ‘suspicions’ can raise their ‘concerns’ via the 
Food Crime Confidential phone or on –line facility. This facility is particularly 
targeted at those working in or around the UK food industry. People with 
suspicions or information about food crime/fraud are encouraged to send this 
to the NFCU via a given email address or by completing a standard intelligence 
report form. However, this form uses the terms ‘submitting officers’ and 
‘protective marking’ which may not be conducive to members of the public 
reporting. 
6.5   Other crime reporting mechanisms 
The role of the National Crime Agency (NCA)  is to bring to justice those serious 
and organised criminals who pose the highest risk.72 The NCA points out that is 
a prescribed body under the whistleblowing legislation but fails to mention 
that this only applies to workers and that anonymous disclosers cannot be 
protected. The National Fraud Intelligence Bureau provides an online reporting 
service, Action Fraud, which passes information to the police. Interestingly, 
specific mention is made of reporting ‘on behalf of a victim who has not given 
their permission for you to do so’. Finally, Crimestoppers is available to those 
who do not want to be identified. This charity, which is independent of the 
police, sends a report to the relevant body with authority to investigate and 
                                                          
71 There is a subtle difference between food crime and food fraud. The FSA also refers to food issues 
and food problems which may be taken up with local authorities. 
72 The NCA indicates that allegations of bribery and corruption should be reported to its 
International Corruption Unit. 
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this might be a regulator. Crimestoppers is fully aware that there may be 
further questions after information has been supplied and will help to create 
an anonymous login for those who are willing to remain in contact.  An 
interesting feature of reporting to Crimestoppers is that a reward of up to 
£1000 can be paid if the information supplied is of significant use to law 
enforcement agencies.  
 
6.   DISCUSSION 
        In their article on the NMW, Croucher and White state that, following 
HMRC enforcement measures: ‘Approximately half of those still working for 
the same employer said that their employer took retaliatory action against 
them’ (Croucher and White,2007). This was despite the fact that section 23 of 
the NMWA 1998 is supposed to provide workers 73 with protection against 
retaliation 74 and that a broader category of ‘workers’ can invoke the 
whistleblowing provisions of the ERA 1996 if there is a criminal offence or 
breach of any legal obligation. As indicated above, some people who have 
evidence or who suspect infringements of the law will not be ‘workers’ within 
the meaning of either of these statutes so the question arises as to whether 
legislation should be extended in order to encourage  members of the public to 
report infringements or raise concerns about potential non-compliance. It 
seems perfectly possible that some who are not classified as ‘workers’ could 
suffer retaliation relating to the labour market (for example, employers) or a 
specific hiring (for example, self-employed persons) but others would also 
                                                          
73 Defined by NMWA 1998, s 54. 
74  ‘(1) A worker has the right not be to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate 
failure to act, by his employer, done on the ground that – (a) any action was taken, or was proposed 
to be taken, by or on behalf of the worker with a view to enforcing , or otherwise securing the 
benefit of , a right of the worker’s to which this section applies, ..’ 
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benefit from protection against non -work- related reprisals. Indeed, in calling 
for legislative changes to be made, the author is mindful of the fact that 
section 13 of the Irish Protected Disclosures Act 2014 enables citizens generally 
to sue in tort for compensation if they suffer a detriment because someone 
made a protected disclosure .  
 
There can be little doubt that both the DLME and the Independent Anti -
Slavery Commissioner, unlike some other regulators, have given priority to 
deterring non -compliance rather than avoiding burdens on business. 
Nevertheless, they are constrained to work within the Regulators Code 2014 
and have regard to its five principles of good regulation.75  The first principle 
obliges regulators ‘to carry out their activities in a way that supports those 
they regulate to comply and grow’. However, principles three and four focus 
on risk 76 and it would seem that regulators would be adhering to the Code if 
they facilitated the disclosure of information from whistleblowers (inter alia) 
about this. It could also be argued that more pro-active investigations would 
promote a level playing field for employers. However, it seems likely that the 
funding  required will not be available and that enforcement bodies will remain 
dependent on flows of information from other sources. Indeed, the possibility 
of exposure by whistleblowers may put pressure on employers to comply with 
regulations where the risk of an inspection is very low. Even in the unlikely 
event that such bodies received sufficient resources to conduct pro-active 
inspections, they would still receive welcome information from others about 
                                                          
75  See Legislation and Regulatory Reform Act 2008 ss 21-24 and the Legislation and Regulatory 
Reform (Regulatory Functions) (Amendment) Order 2014. S.I. 860. 
76   ‘(iii) Regulators should base their regulatory activities on risk; (iv) Regulators should share 
information about compliance and risk’.  
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compliance outside inspection times. Thus the question of how to facilitate the 
reporting of actual or suspected non-compliance will remain. 
As mentioned above, there is a statutory duty on both employers and 
individuals to report activities related to terrorism, money laundering and 
specified breaches of health and safety legislation.77 There is also a fiduciary 
duty on senior employees to report serious misconduct 78 and this might 
extend to informing a company board about non –compliance with statutory 
obligations. 79 However, imposing a legal duty on everyone to report suspected 
non-compliance with labour market regulations would not be feasible for at 
least four reasons. First, many people will not understand what obligations 
such regulations impose and therefore will be unable to determine whether or 
not there has been compliance. Second, it will often be unclear how suspected 
wrongdoing should be reported, to whom and when. Third, if a duty to report 
is imposed, people may be nervous about breaking it and raise concerns 
prematurely that prove to be unfounded. Fourth, what if many people fail to 
report in a particular situation? Is it a good use of funds to investigate and 
enforce this breach of duty as well as the failure of compliance that should 
have been reported? Thus it would seem preferable to allow people to choose 
whether or not to raise concerns but to encourage them to do so by extending 
the whistleblowing protection currently afforded to workers to the general 
public. In support of this it should be noted that freedom of speech is a human 
right afforded to all persons under Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and other countries protect whistleblowing by citizens. 80 
                                                          
77  See Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974,s 7 and specific regulations.  
78  See Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi & Ors [2004] EWCA Civ 1244 
79  Companies Act 2006, Chapter 2 describes the general duties of directors. 




The DLME acknowledges that unreported or hidden non-compliance is 
arguably the biggest challenge so the question arises as to what people need 
to encourage them to raise concerns. It is suggested that, in order to maximise 
the flow of information, the DLME and IASC should include in their strategies 
the extension of whistleblower rights to non-workers as well as a willingness to 
afford witness protection. In addition to the existing protections available to 
workers under Part IVA of the ERA 1996, a new statute should: require all 
employers to maintain and publicise a whistleblowing procedure that complies 
with good practice; 81 protect people from discrimination at the point of hiring 
or in the provisions of goods and services;  ensure that interim injunctive relief 
is available and make retaliation against whistleblowers a criminal offence. 82 
Such legislation should oblige recipients of concerns to maintain confidentiality 
as far as possible 83 and offer anonymity as a last resort. Unfortunately, 
undertakings about confidentiality and anonymity do not necessarily prevent a 
person being identified in the particular circumstances, for example, the 
whistleblower might be the only one who could be aware of or affected by a 
breach. In addition, it is difficult to investigate the concerns of anonymous 
persons or to protect them from victimisation and for this reason anonymous 
‘hotlines’ are less desirable than open reporting. Nevertheless, it may be better 
to receive anonymous concerns about wrongdoing as a last resort if the person 
reporting would otherwise remain silent about slavery or human trafficking. 
                                                          
81  A Code of Practice should be produced for this purpose. The current British Standards Institute 
Code (British Standards Institute, 2008) is useful but needs to be updated. 
82 A European Directive on Whistleblowing is expected to be approved in July 2019. See European 
Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD). 
83  A statutory Schedule could detail the steps needed to be taken by recipients of concerns. 
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Ideally, the public interest test which currently has to be satisfied for a 
disclosure of information to be protected under Part IVA of the ERA 1996 
would be dropped altogether on the grounds that the uncertainty it creates 
may deter disclosures of critical information.84 However, its retention would 
not cause problems for those raising concerns about infringements of labour 
market regulations if it was explicitly stated that a disclosure about such 
matters was in the public interest. Indeed, such specification would be 
consistent with the call for the public interest to be defined for the purposes of 
Part IVA of the ERA 1996.85 Thus the upshot would be that anyone who 
suffered reprisals for raising concerns based on a reasonable suspicion or belief 
that wrongdoing had occurred, was occurring or was likely to occur would be 
offered some protection. It is acknowledged that it is difficult to prevent 
retaliation from taking place but at least potential whistleblowers would be 
given the right to seek compensation for losses suffered. Informing the public 
about these new rights would require a serious publicity campaign and it is 
hoped that the DLME could liaise with relevant Government departments and 
other organisations to ensure that a better job is done than is currently the 
case in communicating the nature and purpose of the existing whistleblowing 
provisions. 86  
Even if the extension of statutory protection for whistleblowers does not take 
place,87 the DLME should try to ensure that the regulators he is responsible for 
                                                          
84 See the criteria set out by the Court of Appeal in Chesterton Global Limited v Nurmohamed [2017] 
IRLR 837. 
85  See Lewis (2015).   
86 See Public Concern at Work Annual Reports on the lack of awareness of ERA 1996, Part IVA. 
87 It is worth noting that the US Occupational Health and Safety Administration currently administers 
twenty -two whistleblower protection laws in areas such as workplace safety, food safety, financial 
reporting and waste, fraud, and abuse in government contracts. See Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, Whistleblower Statutes Desk Aid, Occupational Safety 
https://www.whistleblowers.gov/sites/default/files/whistleblowers/whistleblower_acts-
desk_reference.pdf [last accessed 21st December 2017] 
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provide the maximum amount of information to the intelligence hub that has 
been identified as being so crucial to effective labour market enforcement. As 
part of his co-ordinating role he might build on the experiences of other 
regulators as well as the private sector in order to disseminate best practices in 
promoting whistleblowing. As indicated above, this would include: policy 
statements which explain why whistleblowing is important and how it differs 
from a complaint or grievance;88  the provision of user -friendly forms and 
‘hotlines’ which are open to all and can facilitate two -way communications; 
emphasising that workers and non-workers only need to have a reasonable 
suspicion or belief about wrongdoing rather than hard evidence; undertakings 
about maintaining confidentiality and anonymity as far as possible; and the 
provision of feedback. It is not suggested that rewards should be more readily 
available as this might shift attention to the motive of the messenger rather 
than their message.89 Nevertheless, the enforcement authorities might find it 
beneficial to make discretionary awards that recognise the contribution made 
by individuals who report alleged non-compliance in difficult situations. 
Indeed, award ceremonies provide an opportunity to demonstrate the value of 
the information received and encourage potential whistleblowers to raise 
concerns.  
 
                                                          
88 See, for example, the website of the UK Civil Aviation Authority which states that ‘safety concerns 
should not confused with a personal grievance or complaint’. In the US, the Inspector General Act 
1978  s7 provides that an Inspector General ‘may receive and investigate complaints or information 
from an employee of the establishment concerning the possible existence of an activity constituting 
a violation of law, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority 
or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety’. At the National Labor Relations 
Board, the Office of the Inspector General receives information anonymously or confidentially 
‘which may be characterised as a complaint, allegation or referral’. 
https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/inspector-general#t37n3194 
89  Apparently, less than 1 per cent of those who could claim a reward via Crimestoppers do so.  
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The DLME should also note the empirical research in several countries which 
shows that potential whistleblowers are deterred by the belief that recipients 
of concerns often fail to deal with wrongdoing.90 Arguably, there is little point 
in facilitating a greater flow of information if labour market bodies are 
unwilling or do not have the resources to make use of the enforcement powers 
available to them. However, the enforcement agencies need to have a 
strategic enforcement policy and, according to Weil (2009 p372), this “requires 
adjusting the way inspectorates respond to complaints so that they remain 
responsive to worker problems yet actively use those investigations to help 




7. CONCLUSION  
In Section 3 above we identified deterrence and compliance as the two main 
approaches to enforcement and the author agrees with the DLME that a strong 
deterrence approach is need. However, it is also accepted that there are a 
number of factors likely to continue to inhibit extra pressure being exerted on 
employers. As Weil puts it (2008 p 350): “ Changes in the workplace, from the 
growth of the informal sector and the fissuring of the traditional employment 
relationship to the decline of trade unions and emergence of new forms of 
workplace risk make the task facing labour inspectors far more complicated”. 
Additionally, the lack of resources  given to the enforcement agencies,as well 
as the dominance of neo-liberal thinking in the approach of politicians to policy 
matters means that public enforcement cannot be relied on.  In these 
                                                          
90 See generally Brown et al (2014) 
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circumstances it becomes increasingly important to consider private forms of 
monitoring. One way forward would be for  enforcement agencies to use as 
many methods as possible to influence the behaviour of employers that they 
are unlikely to inspect.  
The promotion of whistleblowing by workers and non-workers about possible 
infringements of labour rights might deal directly with what the DLME 
describes as a “chronic underreporting of breaches”. 91 It  could also be 
expected to affect both non –compliant and compliant employers. The former 
might respond positively to a realistic threat of investigation  and/or 
reputational damage and the latter would benefit from the knowledge that 
competitors were under pressure to reject labour exploitation as part of their 
business model. Thus the author would extend Weil’s (2008 p349)  call for the 
adoption of “ a clear strategic framework for reacting to incoming complaints” 
to a plea for a strategic approach to promoting the reporting of concerns about 
infringements of labour market regulations.  
Finally, although it is sometimes suggested that giving rights to whistleblowers 
creates a risk of generating false allegations, there is no evidence in this 
country or elsewhere that such allegations are a major problem (Nyrerod and 
Spagnolo 2017).92 More troubling is the fact that those who have concerns 
about labour market infringements may not raise them even when encouraged 
to do so. The willingness of people to speak -up may well depend on some 
form of cost/benefit analysis. On the cost side, there will be the risk of 
retaliation 93 as well as the cost of continuing employer non-compliance with 
                                                          
91 Strategy Document 2018/9  page 72 
92  One possible reason for this is that those who knowingly supply false information expose 
themselves to a range of possible legal sanctions.  
93  This may well be reduced if there is a strong union presence at the workplace.  
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the law. This has to be weighed against the benefit to be gained (both for the 
individual and others affected) from employer compliance if the enforcement 
bodies take action. 94 However, other factors affecting power relations and 
worker voice may well result in enforcement agencies receiving a 
disproportionate amount of information from sectors or organisations where 
there are generally high levels of compliance with the law. 95 Thus it would be 
problematic to have an enforcement strategy that is over –reliant on 
information supplied by concerned individuals. Equally, it would seem rather 
short –sighted of the enforcement bodies if they do not exploit the potential 
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